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Summary
Background In most countries, contacts of confirmed COVID-19 cases are asked to quarantine for 14 days after 
exposure to limit asymptomatic onward transmission. While theoretically effective, this policy places a substantial 
social and economic burden on both the individual and wider society, which might result in low adherence and 
reduced policy effectiveness. We aimed to assess the merit of testing contacts to avert onward transmission and to 
replace or reduce the length of quarantine for uninfected contacts.
Methods We used an agent-based model to simulate the viral load dynamics of exposed contacts, and their potential 
for onward transmission in different quarantine and testing strategies. We compared the performance of quarantines 
of differing durations, testing with either PCR or lateral flow antigen (LFA) tests at the end of quarantine, and daily 
LFA testing without quarantine, against the current 14-day quarantine strategy. We also investigated the effect of 
contact tracing delays and adherence to both quarantine and self-isolation on the effectiveness of each strategy.
Findings Assuming moderate levels of adherence to quarantine and self-isolation, self-isolation on symptom onset 
alone can prevent 37% (95% uncertainty interval [UI] 12–56) of onward transmission potential from secondary cases. 
14 days of post-exposure quarantine reduces transmission by 59% (95% UI 28–79). Quarantine with release after a 
negative PCR test 7 days after exposure might avert a similar proportion (54%, 95% UI 31–81; risk ratio [RR] 0·94, 
95% UI 0·62–1·24) to that of the 14-day quarantine period, as would quarantine with a negative LFA test 7 days after 
exposure (50%, 95% UI 28–77; RR 0·88, 0·66–1·11) or daily testing without quarantine for 5 days after tracing 
(50%, 95% UI 23–81; RR 0·88, 0·60–1·43) if all tests are returned negative. A stronger effect might be possible if 
individuals isolate more strictly after a positive test and if contacts can be notified faster.
Interpretation Testing might allow for a substantial reduction in the length of, or replacement of, quarantine with a 
small excess in transmission risk. Decreasing test and trace delays and increasing adherence will further increase the 
effectiveness of these strategies. Further research is required to empirically evaluate the potential costs (increased 
transmission risk, false reassurance) and benefits (reduction in the burden of quarantine, increased adherence) of 
such strategies before adoption as policy.
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Introduction
To break transmission chains of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), causative agent 
of COVID-19, testing of cases and tracing and 
quarantine of their contacts has been used as a key non-
pharma ceutical intervention in many countries. This 
measure aims to prevent onward transmission from 
secondary infections (individuals infected by an index 
case), and has been used successfully to prevent 
new outbreaks in countries such as South Korea, 
without the need for lockdown-style measures. As of 
November, 2020, guidance in the UK was that contact-
traced individuals must quarantine from the moment 
they are traced until 14 days have elapsed from their 
exposure to the index case. 14 days is the upper bound 
for the incubation period of the virus,1 when more than 
95% of eventually symptomatic individuals will have 
developed symptoms and should subsequently enter a 
further period of self-isolation (10 days in the UK). 
However, there is growing evidence that many contacts 
of cases are unable to effectively quarantine for the 
entirety of this period, particularly those unable to work 
from home, or those caring for vulnerable people.2 The 
increasing availability of testing, particularly rapid, low-
cost lateral flow antigen (LFA) tests,3,4 opens up the 
possibility of shorter periods of quarantine when 
combined with a negative test on exit (a test and release 
strategy), or even the avoidance of quarantine entirely if 
it is replaced with daily testing. If effective, both these 
strategies have the potential to substantially reduce the 
burden of quarantine on uninfected contacts, which 
could simultaneously improve quarantine adherence 
and reduce the economic, personal, financial, and social 
costs of the current policy.
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RT-PCR involves amplification and quantification of 
viral RNA within a nose or throat sample, with a low 
cycle threshold (Ct) value indicating the presence of 
greater quantities of viral genetic material and hence a 
greater likelihood of being infected.5 Due to the 
amplification step, PCR is highly sensitive and specific to 
the presence of SARS-CoV-2 viral RNA, but requires 
samples to be sent to a laboratory for processing before 
return of a result—a process that currently takes an 
average of 2 days in the UK.6 In contrast, LFA tests are 
pregnancy test-style, point-of-care devices that test for the 
presence of SARS-CoV-2 antigen and allow for return of 
results within 15–30 min. LFA tests are reportedly 
substantially cheaper, and might be produced and 
distributed more easily and frequently, than PCR tests;3 
however, the absence of an amplification step results in a 
lower sensitivity than PCR tests. Despite this decreased 
sensitivity, the speed at which results are available might 
allow for repeated testing of individuals, which could 
enable faster isolation of cases and reduced transmission 
potential even if the ability to detect infections is lower 
than with PCR testing.
Testing of traced contacts might detect incubating and 
asymptomatic cases, allowing for a reduction in the post-
exposure quarantine period from 14 days. Key to this is the 
timing of testing, because testing contacts too early or too 
late in their infection might lead to false-negative results. 
Another crucial factor is the delay in testing and tracing—
ie, how long has passed since exposure to the index case to 
the isolation of their contacts—because approximately 
half of SARS-CoV-2 transmission occurs before the onset 
of symptoms.7 Additionally, the current 14-day quarantine 
period is poorly adhered to by contacts of cases, with only 
10·9% reporting that they did not leave the house in the 
14 days after exposure to the index case.8 Reducing the 
length of the quarantine period might increase adherence 
and therefore avert more transmission overall.
Here, we aimed to evaluate the effect of different 
quarantine and testing strategies on reducing onward 
transmission from traced secondary infections using a 
mathematical model to simulate viral load dynamics, 
tracing and testing timings, and other relevant para-
meters. We varied the required post-exposure quarantine 
period, and the timing, number, and type of tests 
(standard PCR tests or rapid LFA tests). We also 
investigated the effect of reducing testing and tracing 
delays, and the effect of reduced adherence to quarantine. 
As an alternative to quarantine, we considered daily 
testing on being traced as a contact, and estimated the 
number of consecutive daily tests required before 
leaving isolation that would result in a similar reduction 
in transmission to that achieved by quarantine.
Methods
Contact tracing model of infected individuals
We used a stochastic, individual-based model to simulate 
an individual’s exposure time, viral load trajectory, 
symptom onset, and tracing and testing timings. The 
model was specified in such a way as to focus on the 
cases’ infectivity, rather than the number of additional 
cases generated, and, as such, is independent of the 
number of secondary or further cases generated.
Research in context
Evidence before this study
During the COVID-19 pandemic, a standard 14-day quarantine 
period from the day a contact was exposed to an index case has 
been required in the UK and elsewhere. This approach aims 
to avert onward transmission during infected contacts’ 
presymptomatic period. This strategy, although a crucial part of 
the global pandemic response to interrupt transmission chains, 
places considerable social, financial, and economic pressure on 
quarantining individuals and society. A search of the literature 
on Dec 3, 2020, using the terms “quarantine AND test* AND 
(COVID* OR SARS*) AND effect* AND contact tracing” returned 
59 results on PubMed and 1934 results on medRxiv; however, 
no study had investigated the effect of heterogeneity in viral 
load or the effectiveness of daily testing without quarantine.
Added value of this study
We modelled the individual severe acute respiratory syndrome 
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) viral load trajectories of the 
contacts of confirmed cases to calculate the effect of a range of 
quarantine and testing strategies. To the best of our knowledge, 
this is the first analysis of possible strategies to reduce or 
replace the quarantine requirement through rapid antigen 
testing. We found that quarantine until a PCR or lateral flow 
antigen test on day 7 after exposure (with early release if 
negative) might avert as much transmission as the 14-day 
quarantine period. Additionally, daily repeated lateral flow 
antigen testing of traced contacts for 5 days, with isolation 
only after a positive test, might allow for the quarantine 
requirement to be removed with a small increase in 
transmission risk, which could itself be offset by increased 
participation and adherence to isolation.
Implications of all the available evidence
The ability to identify and isolate infected individuals rapidly 
and comprehensively is crucial to reduce the incidence of 
SARS-CoV-2. Testing contacts of confirmed cases might enable 
the required quarantine periods for uninfected individuals to be 
substantially shortened, which could dampen the economic 
and social impact, while potentially increasing compliance. 
Further research (such as field trials) should be done to evaluate 
the potential costs (false reassurance, increased transmission 
risk) and benefits (reduction in quarantine burden, enhanced 
case detection, increased compliance) of such a policy.
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For each individual in the model (index cases and 
secondary cases), we simulated a viral load trajectory of 
Ct values over the course of infection (figure 1) using 
published data to inform our choice of parameters. Each 
curve is parameterised by a baseline Ct level, a peak 
Ct value, and an end time, representing a return to 
baseline. We assumed a baseline Ct of 40 on exposure (ie, 
negative for SARS-CoV-2). The timing of the peak Ct was 
sampled from the incubation period (time from exposure 
to onset of symptoms) using the pooled log-normal 
distribution from a published meta-analysis.10 The peak 
Ct value is normally distributed with mean 22·3 and 
SD of 4·29 and the time of cessation of viral shedding, a 
return to baseline, is parameterised as normally dis-
tributed with mean 17 days after exposure and 
SD of 0·94 days for symptomatic individuals,11 with 
asymptomatic individuals having a duration that is 
40% shorter.10 The peak and end times are drawn, for 
each individual, in such a way that each individual is at 
the same quantile, q, in the cumulative densities of each 
distribution; this guarantees that the ordering of peak 
and end is maintained and that there are no rapid returns 
to baseline Ct after a slow transition to peak Ct. We then 
fit a cubic Hermite spline12 to the generated exposure, 
peak, and end values for each individual, constraining 
the slope of the curve to be zero at each of them, to 
simulate viral load kinetics (in Ct) over the course of 
infection. We assumed that an individual is infectious 
during the time period that their Ct value is less than 30.13 
If an individual’s Ct trajectory does not drop below 30, 
they are considered to never be infectious and therefore 
not relevant for transmission. We assumed individuals 
are uniformly infectious during this period of Ct less 
than 30.
We simulated index cases as individuals who become 
exposed, then infectious, at which point they begin 
exposing their contacts and generating secondary cases. 
Once the index cases develop symptoms, they begin a 
period of self-isolation when they are unable to generate 
additional secondary cases. We assumed that 1 day after 
symptom onset, they seek out and have a PCR test that is 
returned positive, which begins the process of contact 
tracing. Based on the latest National Health Service test 
and trace data, we assumed that it takes a delay of 3 days 
from the sample being taken to contacts being instructed 
to quarantine.14 To investigate the effect of faster contact 
tracing (eg, through rapid testing and application-based 
tracing15), we considered halved delays (1·5 days) and 
instant test and trace (0 days) as a sensitivity analysis.
Quarantine and testing strategies
We assumed that all contacts are successfully identified 
and traced and, that once traced, are subject to one of 
several strategies designed to avert onward transmission. 
In the quarantine-based strategy, we investigated quaran-
tine durations of 0 days, 3 days, 5 days, 7 days, 10 days, 
and 14 days post exposure to the index case, with either 
no testing or testing with PCR or LFA tests on the final 
day of the specified quarantine period (to highlight the 
effect of said test at the end of quarantine). However, if 
the end-of-quarantine test is scheduled to occur before 
the time of the secondary case’s tracing, we assumed 
that they are tested as soon as they are traced; hence, a 
0-day quarantine with a test will be equivalent to an 
immediate test and release strategy. In the daily testing 
strategy, contacts are required to take an LFA test 
every day for 1 day, 3 days, 5 days, 7 days, 10 days, or 
14 days after they are traced and are not required to 
quarantine unless they either develop symptoms or test 
positive. Secondary cases displaying symptoms at any 
point post exposure, or testing positive at any time, will 
then isolate until 10 days have passed since onset of 
symptoms.16 Given that asymptomatic secondary cases 
never develop symptoms, they will self-isolate only if 
Figure 1: Simulated Ct curves for ten individuals infected with SARS-CoV-2
Dashed lines represent thresholds for detection probabilities9 and the shaded region, with boundary at Ct 30, indicates the time during which individuals are 
considered infectious. One of the individuals never reaches Ct 30 and hence they are considered to not be infectious; however, they will be detectable by PCR and 
with probability 0·3 for LFA during tε(5–13). Ct=cycle threshold. SARS-CoV-2=severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus disease 2. LFA=lateral flow antigen.
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they test positive. We sampled the proportion of 
secondary infections that are asymptomatic from a beta 
distribution, which has a median of 31% (95% CI 24–38;17 
table). Further details on the model parameters are 
provided in the table.
The probability of detecting an infected and possibly 
infectious individual depends on their Ct value at the 
time of testing, and is drawn from their individual 
Ct trajectory (figure 1). For PCR, we assumed that the 
probability of detection is 100% for Ct below 35 and 0% 
above 35. For LFA, we approximated the probability of 
detection is 95% for Ct below 27, 65% for Ct from 
27 to 30, 30% for Ct from 30 to 35, and 0% above 35, 
approximated based on the results of the Innova rapid 
antigen test evaluation.4 As a sensitivity analysis to 
investigate the effect of lower Innova LFA sensitivity, we 
used the probability of detection for a given Ct as 
reported in the Liverpool Mass Testing Pilot.18
As a moderate baseline scenario, we assumed that 50% 
of individuals adhere to quarantine and 67% adhere to 
self-isolation guidelines. To investigate the effect of 
increased or reduced adherence to quarantine and self-
isolation on the effectiveness of the programme, we 
considered adherences of 100% and 0% for post-tracing 
quarantine, and 100% and 0% for self-isolation after a 
positive test or symptom onset. We assumed adherence 
as a binary variable (adhering or not-adhering) for each 
individual by sampling from a Bernoulli distribution 
with the probability given by the proportion adhering.
Transmission potential
For each secondary case, we considered the infectious 
period as the period of time when the individual’s Ct values 
are less than 30. We then calculated the amount of the 
infectious period spent in quarantine, or in self-isolation 
due to onset of symptoms or after a positive test, as 
transmission potential averted. Assuming that the majority 
of SARS-CoV-2 transmission is driven by superspreading 
events,19 we report the uncertainty associated with the 
average secondary transmission potential averted per 
superspreading event by simulating 1000 index cases with 
ten secondary cases. We calculated the median and inner 
50% and 95% ranges for the sum of the secondary cases’ 
infectious periods spent in quarantine or self-isolation 
divided by the sum of secondary cases’ infectious periods if 
there were no quarantine or self-isolation requirements. 
Because the model considers averting this transmission 
rather than focusing on the generation of additional cases, 
the average amount of infectivity in secondary cases 
averted by quarantine or testing, or both, is independent of 
the number of additional cases generated, and the choice 
of the number of secondary cases affects the width of the 
uncertainty intervals (UIs; here we consider a reasonable 
upper bound on secondary cases based on super spreading, 
as mentioned, in an attempt to faithfully characterise real-
world uncertainty). We also calculated the risk ratio (RR) of 
transmission averted by the given strategy compared with 
the baseline scenario (a 14-day quarantine period with no 
testing, 3 days from testing of the index case to tracing, 
50% adherence to quarantine, and 67% adherence to self-
isolation).
In our calculation of the transmission potential averted, 
we considered that in the case that no transmission is 
averted, an individual will be as infectious as if there 
were no testing or quarantine. In such a case, that 
individual is likely to go on to infect a number of 
additional individuals, R, which is distributed with mean 
R0 and dispersion k. With a fraction, a, of their infectivity 
Description Value Source
Incubation period Time from exposure to 
onset of symptoms
Log-normal (log-mean 1·63, 
log-SD 0·5), median 5·1 days, 




Infectious period Time for which Ct is less 
than 30
Symptomatic individuals mean 
7·56 days, SD 1·54 days; 
asymptomatic individuals mean 
4·32 days, SD 1·09 days
Derived
Asymptomatic fraction 
of secondary cases, a
Proportion of infections 
that are asymptomatic
Beta (alpha 51, beta 115), 







Table: Model parameters and their values in simulation of cases’ infection histories and testing
Figure 2: Transmission potential averted with quarantine-based strategies and daily testing strategies
Ratio was calculated as the sum of days of secondary cases’ infectious periods spent in quarantine or self-isolation 
divided by the sum of days of secondary cases’ infectious periods. Ratios are shown for each strategy versus the 
baseline of 14 days’ quarantine with no testing, for quarantine-based strategies (quarantine required from time of 
tracing until n days have passed since exposure, either with or without a test on the final day; A) and daily testing 
strategies (daily LFA tests without quarantine for n days from tracing, isolating only after a positive test result; B). 
Quarantine and self-isolation adherence were assumed to be 50% and 67%, respectively. The delay from an index 
case’s positive test until the tracing of secondary cases was assumed to be 3 days (current average).16 Central bars 
indicate the median ratio for a given strategy, with 95% and 50% uncertainty intervals indicated by light and dark 
shaded bars, respectively. LFA=lateral flow antigen.
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prevented, an infectious individual is expected to infect 
(1–a)R individuals. Hence, the transmission potential 
averted can be thought of as a linear scaling of R.
The model was coded in R, version 4.0.3, and the entire 
code required to reproduce this analysis is available online.
Role of the funding source
The funders of this study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. All authors had full access to all 
of the data and the final responsibility to submit for 
publication.
Results
According to our model, relying only on 67% of eventually 
symptomatic people self-isolating on developing symp-
toms, 37% (95% UI 12–56) of trans mission might be 
averted from secondary infections, with an RR of 0·68 
(95% UI 0·22–0·95) compared with the baseline scenario. 
By tracing contacts and instructing them to self-isolate for 
a period of time after their last exposure to the index 
case, additional transmission might be averted from 
asymptomatic and presymptomatic secondary cases 
(figure 2; appendix p 1). The amount of transmission 
averted rises to 46% (95% UI 16–63) with an RR of 0·81 
(95% UI 0·49–0·99) at 7 days post exposure; to 54% 
(95% UI 24–71) with an RR of 0·92 (95% UI 0·72–1·00) at 
10 days post exposure; and to 59% (95% UI 28–79, baseline) 
at 14 days post exposure.
The amount of transmission potential averted can be 
increased if LFA or PCR testing is done on the final day of 
quarantine (or on tracing, if the specified quarantine 
period ends before a case is traced) and people who 
receive a negative result are released. The introduction of 
For the code to reproduce 
analysis see https://github.com/
cmmid/pcr_test_trace
Figure 3: Transmission potential averted with reduced test and trace delays
Ratio was calculated as the sum of days of secondary cases’ infectious periods spent in quarantine or self-isolation divided by the sum of days of secondary cases’ 
infectious periods. Ratios are shown for each strategy versus the baseline of 14 days’ quarantine with no testing, for quarantine-based strategies (quarantine required 
from time of tracing until n days have passed since exposure, either with or without a test on the final day; A) and daily testing strategies (daily LFA tests without 
quarantine for n days from tracing, isolating only after a positive test result; B). Quarantine and self-isolation adherence were assumed to be 50% and 67%, 
respectively. The delay from an index case’s positive test until the tracing of secondary cases was assumed to be 3 days (current average16) in the baseline scenario, 
with halved and eliminated delays investigated. Central bars indicate the median ratio for a given strategy, with 95% and 50% uncertainty intervals indicated by light 
and dark shaded bars, respectively. LFA=lateral flow antigen.
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an immediate test is estimated to avert 49% (95% UI 
24–68) of transmission with an LFA test (RR 0·79, 95% 
UI 0·38–1·32) and 53% (95% UI 24–79) of transmission 
with a PCR test (RR 0·89, 95% UI 0·62–1·51; figure 2; 
appendix p 1). However, the greater time spent in 
quarantine waiting for a PCR test result might avert 
additional transmission, although these delays might not 
be desirable features of a test and trace system. Shorter 
quarantines with a test on the final day might avert a 
similar amount of transmission to that of the current 
14-day quarantine without a test—ie, 7 days with an LFA 
test (50%, 95% UI 28–77; RR 0·88, 95% UI 0·66–1·11), 
10 days with an LFA test (56%, 95% UI 32–81; RR 0·95, 
95% UI 0·80–1·02), 7 days with a PCR test (54%, 95% UI 
31–81; RR 0·94, 95% UI 0·62–1·24), and 10 days with a 
PCR test (56%, 95% UI 33–81; RR 1·00, 95% UI 
0·84–1·09). As the quarantine period increases in length, 
the relative contribution of a test is lessened, as the 
majority of the infectious period is spent in quarantine. 
With 14 days of mandatory quarantine, 59% (95% UI 
28–79, baseline) of transmission is averted with no 
testing, and 59% (95% UI 33–82) of transmission is 
averted (RR 1·00, 95% UI 1·00–1·04) with either a PCR or 
LFA test (figure 2). Although no shorter quarantine 
strategy with testing might exceed the median amount 
averted by the 14-day quarantine, all PCR testing strategies 
evaluated avert equivalent amounts of transmission 
within the 50% uncertainty bounds.
If traced contacts are required to take a daily LFA test for 
n days after tracing instead of entering quarantine, 5 days 
of testing might avert 50% (95% UI 23–81; RR 0·88, 
95% UI 0·60–1·43) of transmission, with additional days 
of testing averting a similar amount (figure 2).
Our model suggest that if test and trace delays (ie, the 
time from the index case having a test to the tracing of 
their contacts) can be reduced, shorter quarantines might 
become more viable, because the proportion of the 
infectious period spent in the community before tracing 
decreases (figure 3; appendix p 2). For example, if test 
and trace delays can be reduced to zero (ie, through 
digital contact tracing), the median RR of a 10-day 
quarantine with no testing might exceed the effect of the 
Figure 4: Transmission potential averted with increased adherence to self-isolation and quarantine
Ratio was calculated as the sum of days of secondary cases’ infectious periods spent in quarantine or self-isolation divided by the sum of days of secondary cases’ 
infectious periods. Ratios are shown for each strategy versus the baseline of 14 days’ quarantine with no testing, for quarantine-based strategies (quarantine required 
from time of tracing until n days have passed since exposure, either with or without a test on the final day; A) and daily testing strategies (daily LFA tests without 
quarantine for n days from tracing, isolating only after a positive test result; B). Quarantine and self-isolation adherence were assumed to be 50% and 67%, 
respectively, in the baseline scenario, with 100% explored for both. The delay from an index case’s positive test until the tracing of secondary cases was assumed to be 
3 days (current average).16 Central bars indicate the median ratio for a given strategy, with 95% and 50% uncertainty intervals indicated by light and dark shaded bars, 
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14-day quarantine with a 3-day test and trace delay 
(RR 1·07, 95% UI 0·80–1·64). The effect of daily testing 
strategies might also exceed the effect of the current 
14-day strategy with zero delays (5 days of LFA testing 
RR 1·01, 95% UI 0·54–1·62); however, because secondary 
infections will be traced earlier in their infection when 
viral loads are lower, the likelihood of false negatives 
increases, and additional days of testing (ie, 7–10 days) 
might be required (figure 3; appendix p 2).
We found that if rates of adherence to quarantine and 
self-isolation can be boosted, substantial increases in 
effect over that of the baseline 14-day quarantine policy 
might be achieved, assuming that in the baseline scenario, 
50% of individuals adhere to quarantine and 67% of 
individuals adhere to post-symptom or post-positive test 
self-isolation (figure 4; appendix p 3). For example, if 
individuals adhere perfectly to self-isolation after a positive 
test in a daily testing scenario, 5 days of testing with LFA 
after tracing might avert 80% (95% UI 66–89) of 
transmission (RR 1·33, 95% UI 1·04–2·42).
If more conservative estimates of LFA sensitivity are 
used,18 lateral flow tests might be less efficacious, with 
quarantine and a negative LFA test at 7 days after exposure 
averting 44% (95% UI 17–66) of transmission (RR 0·79, 
95% UI 0·54–1·04) and 5 days of LFA testing without 
quarantine averting 43% (95% UI 17–64) of transmission 
(RR 0·77, 95% UI 0·34– 1·16; appendix p 4).
Discussion
Using a model combining SARS-CoV-2 viral load 
dynamics with a range of possible quarantine and 
testing strategies for contact tracing, we estimate that 
the recommended 14 days of quarantine after last 
exposure from a confirmed case can prevent 59% 
(95% UI 28–79) of onward transmission from secondary 
cases, assuming 50% adherence to quarantine and a 
total delay of 3 days from the index case having a test to 
the tracing of their contacts. Assuming the same level of 
adherence for quarantine and 67% adherence to self-
isolation after symptom onset or a positive test, an LFA 
test 7 days after exposure with quarantine from tracing 
until testing or alternatively daily testing with LFA 
tests for 5 days after tracing might avert a similar 
proportion to that of the 14-day quarantine (RR 0·88, 
95% UI 0·66–1·11 and RR 0·88, 95% UI 0·60–1·43, 
respectively), if all tests are negative, potentially allowing 
for the reduction of or removal of the quarantine 
requirement for traced contacts. In strategies requiring 
quarantine, the additional benefit of testing diminishes 
with longer quarantine durations, because infectious 
people spend a greater proportion of their infectious 
period in quarantine and have a higher probability of 
developing symptoms (if ever symptomatic) and self-
isolating. PCR testing performs better than LFA testing 
(by averting a greater amount of transmission); however, 
PCR testing might be limited by the requirement to 
process samples in a laboratory, a process which has 
inherent delays (24 h minimum) and logistical 
limitations (transporting of samples, requirement for 
skilled staff).
We found that the effectiveness of contact tracing can be 
limited by low adherence to quarantine and isolation. Data 
on adherence rates are sparse. A UK survey found that only 
10·9% of contacts adhere to quarantine and 18·2% adhere 
to self-isolation;8 however, adherence was defined as not 
leaving the house at all in the 14 days, with most breaches 
being brief and of low transmission risk—eg, solo outdoor 
exercise. Hence, we assumed a higher, moderate baseline 
of 50% of individuals fully adhering to quarantine (and 
therefore having their transmission potential reduced to 
zero), which we assumed increased to 67% for self-isolation 
after symptom onset or a positive test, which might better 
reflect the rate of public involvement in contact tracing. It 
is possible that some of the factors inhibiting adherence to 
the current 14-day quarantine are difficulty in completing 
fully due to social and financial burdens, and low 
perception of the risk to others given an unknown case 
status.20 As such, reducing the duration of quarantine and 
increasing the use of tests to compensate might raise 
adherence by making it easier to complete a full term, and 
by making cases aware that they might be infectious. 
Investigating this assumption in our modelling, we found 
that raised adherence increases the benefit of both short 
quarantines with testing (at the end of quarantine) and 
daily testing, beyond that of the current 14-day quarantine. 
As well as the boost in adherence, which might arise 
through these strategies, effort should be made to increase 
adherence through other methods, such as increasing 
trust in government and public health advice; producing 
clear guidance on the specified contact tracing protocol; 
increasing the perceived importance of quarantine in 
reducing transmission; building strong local and social 
support networks; and increasing the level of income 
support and provision of other supplies.20 Further work on 
COVID-19 quarantine adherence is required to understand 
how quarantined individuals behave and whether isolation 
of cases and suspected cases in hotels or hospitals might 
be considered to prevent onward transmission.
The ability of any contact tracing programme to 
minimise the transmission potential of secondary cases 
is limited substantially by delays from the testing of 
index cases to the tracing of their contacts, because 
secondary cases might have been transmitting for a 
number of days in the community during the time that 
contact tracing is taking place. If these delays can be 
reduced through the adoption of rapid testing, rapid 
digital contact tracing,15 or both, a greater overall 
proportion of transmission might be averted; eg, 
68% (95% UI 38–86) of transmission might be averted 
from secondary cases if contacts can be notified as soon 
as a case is tested (assuming the same baseline 
assumptions for adherence). As such, great emphasis 
should be put on monitoring and reducing the time 
taken to reach secondary cases. However, if such 
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reductions are achieved, a proportionally longer 
quarantine period or greater number of days of testing 
will be required to ensure that quarantine or testing 
overlaps with the period when contacts are most 
infectious.
Our study has several limitations. In this analysis, we 
have focused on the potential for quarantine and testing 
to reduce the transmission potential of traced secondary 
infections and have not evaluated the number, and cost, 
of tests that might be required, nor the possibility of false 
positives, which—despite the high specificity of PCR and 
LFA—might arise in mass testing of asymptomatic 
individuals. However, in the context of contact tracing, 
where prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 among contacts of 
confirmed cases is likely to be higher than among the 
general public, this is unlikely to lead to a low positive 
predictive value. Due to a lack of currently available data, 
we have assumed that index cases seek out and take a 
PCR test 1 day after the onset of symptoms. We do not 
consider other aspects of the test and trace system that 
might result in poor outcomes, such as the fraction of 
index cases that do not engage with the service,21 variation 
in the number of cases generated by each index case,22 or 
the proportion of secondary cases missed by tracers.23 
Additionally, we do not consider the quarantine, or 
testing of the contacts of contacts (ie, household 
members) who test positive, or both, which might 
constitute a substantial additional effect. For our 
assumptions of adherence to quarantine and self-
isolation, we selected static, moderate values of the 
proportion of contacts who adhere to each. It is probable 
that adherence varies (eg, between individuals and 
waning with the duration of quarantine); however, in the 
absence of suitable data on the functional form of such 
changes in adherence, we take a parsimonious approach 
to modelling adherence.
One of the simplifying assumptions we have made is 
that the Ct curve is a reasonable proxy for both 
probability of detection by testing (with both PCR 
and LFA) and potential for transmission. Alternative 
parameterisations of transmission potential are 
possible,24 but unresolved challenges in comparing 
testing approaches with the transmission potential 
based on a combination of an incubation period9 and 
infectivity relative to onset of symptoms25 include the 
need to convert from PCR sensitivity curves26,27 to LFA in 
such a way that the timing and height of the two curves 
are matched meaningfully. A more complete picture of 
daily testing would require mapping a curve of viral load 
to one of test sensitivity and one of infectivity. 
Additionally, while we model viral load and the 
sensitivity of LFA relative to Ct by PCR in line with the 
University of Oxford and Public Health England 
evaluation,4 Ct values might not be directly comparable 
between laboratories if different RT-PCR platforms are 
used.5 As such, we have provided a sensitivity analysis 
using the lower reported sensitivities of LFA in the 
Liverpool Mass Testing Pilot18 and discussion of results 
in the context of other studies (appendix p 4).
We have shown that quarantine with a test on day 7 
post exposure or 5 days of LFA tests could reduce the 
transmission potential from secondary cases notified 
through contact tracing to similar levels to that of a 14-day 
quarantine without testing. However, factoring in 
structural issues in contact tracing, such as testing and 
tracing delays and poor adherence of traced cases, greatly 
reduces the ability of quarantine and testing to reduce 
onward transmission, and addressing these should be a 
focus of policy.
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